By the early 2000’s, the false promises of the Oslo Accords were becoming clear. The peace process was crumbling, and by 2001 the Second Intifada was in full swing. The situation was not all that different from what we are looking at right now: prospects for peace seemed low, and the odds of a peacefully negotiated solution seemed even lower.
Enter the Arab Peace Initiative (API). Adopted at the Beirut Summit of the Arab League in March 2002, it presented a deal which its Saudi-led negotiating team thought Israel could not refuse: full diplomatic recognition of Israel by all members of the Arab League (and by the Council of Islamic Cooperation, of which Iran is a member state), in exchange for Israel agreeing to its provisions for a two-state solution.
These provisions, which center on the topics of borders, security, Jerusalem and refugees, are surprisingly moderate. The API calls for borders along 1967 lines, a starting point endorsed by President Obama; it offers “security partnership” between Israel and the Arab states; it calls for the establishment of a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, a position reaffirmed by Secretary Kerry; and rather than demanding the right of return, the API suggests a “just” and “agreed upon” solution to the question of Palestinian refugees.
Israeli officials were understandably skeptical. The API seemed to come from nowhere, and Saudi Arabia was certainly not a historic or natural ally. But as a Molad report on the API points out, the Saudis were motivated by their own security concerns, the rise of Iran as a regional power, and a desire to improve their image in the West after 9/11. Contrary to the belief that the Arab states want nothing but the destruction of Israel, the Arab League negotiators understood that a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would offer mutual economic, social, cultural, and security benefits.
However, any doubt as to whether or not the offer was sincere should have been erased when the Arab League reaffirmed the API in 2007, and as it garnered public support from Arab leaders. Even Ismail Haniyeh, the Hamas prime minister of Gaza, said that while he did not support the API, he may be willing to use it as a foundation for negotiations should Israel agree to similar terms. Last month Turki al-Faisal, the former Saudi ambassador to the U.S., reaffirmed his commitment to the API in Haaretz, specifying the centrality of the two-state solution and diplomatic recognition of Israel.
Israeli analysts continue to express doubt about the vagueness of a number of provisions, specifically the “agreed upon” solution to the Palestinian refugee question. There is also the problem of the Golan Heights, which al-Faisal suggests should go to Syria. These concerns are legitimate. Israel would be right to take them up with Arab League negotiators.
However, the API has yet to be discussed by the Knesset since its inception in 2002, nor has it been seriously considered by any Prime Minister since Ehud Olmert. Prime Minister Netanyahu has been vehemently opposed to the API, calling it “dangerous for Israel and dangerous for peace;” Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman went further, calling it “a recipe for the destruction of Israel.” Despite their failure to ground their criticism in specific concerns, they have succeeded in blocking the API from ever reaching the Knesset floor. At this time, Molad estimates the possibility that the current government considers the API is all but negligible.
Why will the current governing coalition not even consider the API? Concern with some of the provisions is one issue; the refusal to even discuss them is another. The dismissal of the API, then, is symptomatic of Netanyahu’s continued denial of the two-state solution, which he recently openly expressed he did not believe was achievable. Further, the dismissal alienates the Arab states who are crucial partners for a lasting stability in the region, and denies the opportunity for the peace among neighbors which Israel has always sought.
The Arab League cannot be ignored as a party to the peace process, and the Knesset cannot continue to ignore the Arab Peace Initiative. The API provides the opportunity for diplomatic recognition from some of Israel’s most enduring enemies, and sets a reasonable framework for negotiations that could lead to regional stability. If Israel continues to pass on this opportunity—as Molad and other analysts predict they will—they will not only be turning down the API, but also reaffirming a lack of faith in Arab league negotiators who are vital to the peace process. Further, by failing to discuss it at all, the governing coalition ultimately reveals a lack of dedication to the two-state solution itself.
This continued refusal prompts us to ask ourselves: despite their lip-service to it, do Netanyahu and his coalition support the two-state solution at all? The answer, after considering the case of the API, appears to be no.
Maddie Ulanow is a student at Carleton College.
