Why Netanyahu should support Egyptian democracy
As Egypt celebrates, Israel worries.
With Hosni Mubarak out of power, Israelis are concerned that extremists could take over the country, bolster Hamas and scrap Egypt’s peace treaty with the Jewish state—effectively turning Egypt into another Iran.
But Israel can secure its treaty with Egypt and improve its regional status by imitating a historical example–albeit a surprising one: the relationship between Iran and Syria after Iran’s Islamic revolution.
As Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran after a long exile in Iraq and France, the former president of Syria, Hafez al-Assad, was sending congratulatory messages to the revolutionary leader. Assad followed up on this diplomacy and offered his congratulations again when a referendum approved the new constitution of the Islamic Republic.
So far, Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu has taken a less friendly route. Anticipating the possibility of a new Iran-style theocracy in Egypt last month, Netanyahu allowed a limited number of Egyptian soldiers into the usually demilitarized Sinai Peninsula and warned the world that the Muslim Brotherhood could end up ruling Egypt in Mubarak’s place. Before Mubarak’s fall, Israeli President Shimon Peres said, “We always have had and still have great respect for President Mubarak.”
With those actions and words, which the Arab world heard loud and clear, the Netanyahu government put its treaty with Egypt at risk—the very scenario it most fears. Moreover, Israel has undermined its status as the pillar of democracy in the Middle East, not because new democracies are developing around it but because Israel’s leadership has not supported them. It is neither pragmatic nor moral to deny Arab aspirations for civil rights.
As a student of the Middle East at Hebrew University, it seems to me that Israel can best serve its interests by supporting Egyptian democratic aspirations. By acting as Syria did in 1979, Israel can show that it has much to offer Egypt–and that it wants to encourage democracy in the Arab world.
Three decades ago Syria was ruled, as it is today, by the Baath—a secular, Arab nationalist party whose ideology opposed that of Iran. But Syria’s regional isolation, rather than its ideology, motivated its warm relations with Khomeini. Before Iran’s revolution, Syria was alone in the Arab world. Egypt was concluding a peace treaty with Israel; Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran were consolidating a strategic alliance supported by the United States; and Iraq had cut off its oil pipeline to Syria.
Israel faces similar regional isolation today. Its distancing from Turkey, still-dormant diplomatic ties with Iran and a weak relationship with the Egyptian people signal a heavy dependence on the United States. Israel’s frozen relationship with the Palestinians and lack of exit strategy from its occupation of the West Bank leave the country needing a new outlook on its policies and regional relations.
Israel can also utilize its ideology in a way Syria could not with 1979 Iran. Israeli support of Egyptian democratic aspirations will contribute to long-term stability by avoiding the arbitrary, one-man rule of dictators. Egypt has no reason to rebuff reinforcing its ties to Israel. Israel has much to offer economically and in terms of security to a new Egyptian government.
Israel can protect a new Egyptian government from Saudi and Iranian intelligence. A democratic Egypt will support Iran’s democratic, popular opposition—not the current regime. Given that, Egypt faces the threat of Iranian interference. And though the Egyptian military let Iranian ships pass through the Suez Canal recently, permission for subsequent crossings is not guaranteed and depends on a yet-to-be-formed formal policy.
A democratic Egypt would also endanger the authoritarian Saudi crown. Israel’s intelligence services and military could serve as the basis for a strategic alliance against Iran and any other rulers who survive the current turmoil in the region.
Israel can address Egypt’s burgeoning water crisis by offering its desalinization technology. Egyptian dependence on the Nile River makes it vulnerable, as several countries around Lake Victoria–the source of the Nile’s flow in central Africa–have made it clear that they intend to use more of the river’s resources, ignoring decades-old agreements that guaranteed a disproportionate quantity of the river’s water for Egyptian use. Access to Israeli desalinization products could save Egypt significant amounts of money.
Israel has also expanded its ties with those same African states. Newly independent Southern Sudan has accepted overtures from Israel. Israel already has a strong relationships with Ethiopia and Kenya, and is courting Uganda, Ghana and Nigeria. In 2009, Israel signed a deal with 15 western African states to combat starvation and lack of water in their countries. This gives the Jewish state a valuable diplomatic position to mediate water disputes between Egypt and its neighbors, and balance diplomatic pressure from Egypt if need be.
Mubarak’s rule fostered a state-controlled press that published consistently anti-Semitic articles against Israel. His fall should be welcomed as a chance to open the Egyptian press and communicate directly with the Egyptian people, strengthening the current peace treaty. Israel should view this revolution as a chance to encourage an array of Egyptian parties that would diversify Egypt’s political scene, including those representing minorities. The Muslim Brotherhood hardly has a monopoly on Egyptian political philosophy. Many intellectuals accuse the party of accommodating the Mubarak government and remaining an opposition party in name only. Some Egyptians are angry that the Brotherhood did not supporting the first protests against Mubarak on January 25 and subsequently agreed that he keep power over a transitional government.
Coptic Egyptians may provide an avenue to rekindle relationships between Israel and the Middle East’s Christian populations. Egypt has a large Christian population, long agitated by discrimination and ethnic tension in Egypt. The New Year saw a major terrorist attack on a Coptic church in Alexandria. Christians took part in the recent revolution and will look to capitalize on their new opportunities in a representative government.
Most importantly, a successful Egyptian revolution will increase pressure on Iran. The demonstrations in 2009 are still fresh in the minds of young Iranians, who envy the fall of autocratic regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. Iranian opposition figures are trying to start a new round of demonstrations in Iran. A democratic flowering there would alleviate the main strategic adversary Israelis face in the Middle East, no matter which government would take power in Tehran.
Israel should embrace the path of democratization and publicly congratulate a new Egyptian government, as well as the Egyptian people, for its successful efforts to affect nonviolent change. A new approach to Egypt should characterize a broader strategic mindset on the part of Israel’s foreign ministry. An Egyptian revolution does not have to constitute the threat that Iran’s 1979 revolution did. Indeed, it could be the paradigm for a larger 2011 revolution–-sweeping democratic changes across the Muslim world that bring greater acceptance of the Jewish state.
Gedalyah Reback is a graduate of Rutgers University and a master’s student at Hebrew University in Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies. He blogs on Israel and the Middle East at acrazynation.blogspot.com.
