J Street U: Jerusalem and Gaza: What Could and Should Happen

by Moriel Rothman, Middlebury College

George Mitchell is now traveling from Ramallah to Jerusalem as the “proximity talks” resume and President Obama, riding his health care reform wave, seems to be putting a significant amount of weight behind these efforts to get the peace process moving again.

The situation remains fragile but there is a glimmer of hope in that the two sides are beginning to talk again, especially given the events of the past few weeks: Israeli Ehud Barak has reiterated his new favorite line about how Israel must end the occupation for the sake of its future as a Jewish and democratic state [absolutely correct]. American Barack Obama has reportedly been mulling putting an American peace proposal on the table [interesting idea]. Bibi Netanyahu has been jabbering about how he wants peace and how he will not compromise on Jerusalem [painfully contradictory]. Meanwhile, Israeli and Syrian ministers threatened to send each other’s countries back to “stone age” and “prehistoric” times, respectively. Hamas has released disturbing cartoons, a Hamas militant was killed in the West Bank, an unarmed demonstrator was killed in Gaza, Jerusalem Mayor Nir Barkat squawked about how Israel should ignore America’s opposition and continue building in Jerusalem, far-right Israeli groups marched around East Jerusalem spouting morally dubious and politically shortsighted arguments. And of course we still have the ever-looming threat of a nuclear Iran.

I don’t know what will happen, but I’m quite confident that two issues in particular are going to determine the success or failure of this latest round of talks: the futures of Jerusalem and Gaza.

A. Jerusalem

What Could Happen: Netanyahu and Obama, through behind-the-scenes talks and deals (perhaps involving sanctions on Iran) resolve the Jerusalem dispute, freeze Israeli construction in East Jerusalem and the Jerusalem issue is “put on hold.”

Or: The Netanyahu-Obama spat over Jerusalem continues to foment. Netanyahu flexes his political muscle and renews construction in East Jerusalem, counting on his domestic constituency to support damaging and counterproductive policies on Jerusalem construction.

What Should Happen: Netanyahu realizes, as Barak said, that the occupation jeopardizes Israel’s future and that an independent Palestine’s capital must be in East Jerusalem. He decides to reform his coalition, getting rid of the hard line parties like Shas and Yisrael Beiteinu and inviting in the more pragmatic Kadima in an effort to form a governing coalition that will allow him enough room to compromise on Jerusalem and take meaningful steps towards peace.

B. Gaza

What Could Happen: Hamas accepts an Israeli offer to swap Gilad Shalit for a given amount of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails. Shalit’s release could have dramatic consequences: Israel could ease or even end its blockade on Gaza and the potential for Hamas-Fatah rapprochement could increase significantly.

Or: Shalit negotiations make no progress, the blockade remains in place and Hamas’ rhetoric gets even uglier. A resumption of large-scale violence is unlikely in the immediate future, but violent words in the Middle East can set off the spiral toward violent action.

What Should Happen: Israel employs all possible tactics to free Shalit peacefully. Israel lifts the blockade on Gaza while maintaining the arms embargo. The blockade is currently doing little more than denying Palestinians in Gaza certain basic commodities and strengthening Hamas’ rule by giving Hamas an oppressive scapegoat to divert Gazans’ fury away from Hamas’ own oppression. Hamas must be recognized as a permanent actor in the theatre of Israeli and Palestinian affairs. As such, Hamas must be engaged if and when peace talks resume, even as they remain a group whose charter is full of violent, hateful, anti-Semitic rhetoric. De-radicalization could come as a direct result of political inclusion. Hamas’ Islamism could be, for the majority of its supporters, more a vehicle for political protest than for religious dogmatism. The PLO was equally vitriolic in its call for Israel’s destruction prior to its inclusion in the Oslo peace process but by 1993, had taken a virtual 180 degree turn on such positions.

The Middle East does not lend itself to flowering optimism, but now there is reason to hope that good things could happen.